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Abstract
Since 1969 more than a dozen studies have explored the grossly unequal state-level
distribution of New Deal spending. Why did small population rural states such as Nevada,
Montana, and Wyoming receive up to six times as many federal dollars per capita as densely
populated states such as Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York? Empirical studies
employing economic and political variables have had mixed results in explaining this
distribution. What past studies neglect is that a large proportion of New Deal dollars went
towards the creation of public goods, which had spillover effects particularly upon those who
lived in close proximity to these projects. This note suggests that the state-level distribution
of per capita expenditures during the 1930s is consistent with what would be expected to
follow from an economically efficient allocation of public goods.
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  For more than three decades, scholars have explored the efficacy and cause of the 
unequal state-level distribution of per capita New Deal expenditures between 1933 and 
1939.
1  To illustrate, states with small populations, and particularly those that are sparsely 
populated, such as Montana, Wyoming, and Nevada received up to six times as many 
federal dollars per capita as states with large and/or dense populations such as New York, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut.  Of course New Deal spending was supposed to target 
economic need.  If these past studies had found, for example, that Nevada had six times the 
need for economic relief and recovery, as proxied by unemployment rate, percentage 
income decline, and other measures, than states such as New Hampshire and Rhode Island, 
scholars would likely have concluded that the pattern of expenditures was, in fact sensible.  
However, per capita spending “loser” states, such as New York, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts, generally had higher unemployment and saw sharper income declines 
during the Great Depression than did the “winner” rural states.   
In absence of finding a strong empirical relationship between economic need and 
spending, public choice interpretations, starting with Wright (1974), have explored political 
explanations for the variation in the state-level spending.  For example, the aforementioned 
Mountain states tended to be “swing states” whose Electoral College votes were generally 
among those most “in play” for presidential elections.  Additionally, small population states 
have, by construction, the most electoral votes per capita since they have more senators per 
capita, an important measure in public choice studies of congressional influence.
2  These 
findings suggest that New Deal spending may have been used to carry out political agendas 
at the expense of economic efficiency.  
An underlying premise of the New Deal expenditure literature is that per capita 
spending is a suitable proxy for the per capita impact those dollars had on the lives of 
citizens.  Empirical models used to examine whether political or economic variables can 
explain the variation in New Deal spending implicitly assume that citizens of Montana, 
where per capita spending was $986, benefited four times as much as citizens of New 
Hampshire, where $248 per capita was spent.  We offer a “spillover” interpretation which 
could help explain some of the rural state per capita expenditure bias, a bias that has also 
been found in studies of the postwar era such as Atlas, et. al. (1995), which has not been 
discussed previously.  Given that a large portion of New Deal spending went toward 
spillover-creating public capital, economic theory suggests that in order to meet the 
efficiency condition for public goods, densely populated states would receive less per 
capita spending than rural states for any level of per capita economic benefit, as is 
                                                 
1Arrington (1969), Reading (1973), Wright (1974), Wallis (1984, 1987, 1998, 2001) 
Anderson and Tollison (1991), Couch and Shugart (1998, 2000), and Fleck (1999, 2001), 
among others have examined the state-level distribution of New Deal expenditures.  
Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) have expanded these studies through the use of 
county-level data.   
2 For a recent example of the importance of senators per capita, see Atlas, et. al. (1995) who 
empirically demonstrate that states “overrepresented” in the Senate—that is small 
population states—secured significantly higher per capita expenditures between 1972 and 
1990. 
  1consistent with 1930s expenditure patterns.  Given this, the state-level per capita 
distribution of New Deal expenditures appears to be consistent with economic efficiency.
3   
  
2. Public capital and the New Deal 
 
While clearly not all New Deal spending went to such projects, the expansion in 
spillover-creating public capital such as roads, bridges, water and sewage systems, schools, 
hospitals, power plants, and airports, among others, during 1930s is indisputable.  For 
example, the installed capacity of publicly owned electricity generating plants rose 55 
percent between 1932 and 1939, while capacity of hydroelectric power rose 35 percent 
across the decade.
4  Miles of surfaced roads on state highway systems increased 34 percent 
from 1930 to 1940.
5  The number of municipal airports rose 42 percent between 1932 and 
1938.
6  The construction of new school capacity accompanied a 50 percent boost in 
enrollment in public high schools from 1930 to 1940.
7  Hospital bed capacity rose 35 
percent between 1933 and 1942.
8  Although the economy languished well below full 
employment throughout the 1930s—and some New Deal spending went toward either 
direct income redistribution or so-called “leaf raking” projects that brought no spillover 
benefits—the stock of public capital boomed in  large part due to a series of government re-
employment projects entailing the construction of such investments. 
If one wishes to evaluate the relative welfare gains brought about by New Deal 
expenditures, the use of per capita spending is clearly problematic.
9  Public capital projects 
are to some extent non-rival and/or non-excludable.  Multiple people, in some cases the 
entire population, may benefit from the production of such projects.  Aschauer (1988, 1989, 
2000), Deno (1988), Munell (1990) Barro (1991), and Easterly and Rebelo (1993), among 
others, empirically demonstrate that public capital investments significantly increase the 
rate of return to private capital investments.  Similarly, Haughwaut (2002) notes that public 
capital can favorably influence the location of future economic activity and provides 
                                                 
3 We not concerned with intent in this note—i.e. we do not speculate as to whether or not 
New Dealers meticulously attempted to meet the efficiency condition for the allocation of 
public goods.  Independent of motive, which has been a large focus of past work, the 
primary purpose of this note is to show that the distribution of New Deal spending is in line 
with what would be expected to follow from an efficient allocation of public goods. 
4 Power capacity statistics are from the 1940 Statistical Abstract of the United States, tables 
444 and 457. 
5 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1943, table 484. 
6 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940, table 514.  
7 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1943, table 231. 
8 The data point for 1933 is from the Journal of the American Medical Association (1934), 
page 1009, and the 1942 data point is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1943, table 87. 
9 Not to say that this is the primary objective of past New Deal political economy studies.  
Such studies have generally been attempting to measure the responsiveness of federal 
spending to political and economic variables, rather than the impact of that spending.  
However, “impact” may provide a potential explanation for the general weakness of 
political and economic variables in capturing the variation in New Deal spending.   
  2various non-pecuniary household benefits.  Thus public capital projects likely helped 
promote recovery from the Great Depression in the areas near such projects beyond any 
demand stimulus those dollars may have provided. 
Past literature has focused primarily on divining the “intent” behind the distribution 
of federal expenditures while “efficacy” has been largely implicit in the background.  Let us 
shift the focus.  What if New Dealers, intentionally or not, spent economically efficient 
amounts on public goods—that is shifting any appropriation from one state to another 
would cause a net loss in aggregate welfare (i.e. the marginal benefits of spending are 
equalized across all states)?
10 What attributes would such an allocation amongst the states 
have? 
The law of diminishing marginal returns suggests that the benefits of each additional 
dollar spent are falling.  Clearly, the marginal benefits of the initial dollars spent creating 
public capital, then, will be highest in highly populated areas, ceteris paribus, since this is 
where a spillover-producing project would generally affect the most people.  In fact, highly 
populated states like New York received the most total New Deal spending, consistent with 
such efficiencies.  To illustrate, dollars spent on the Triborough Bridge complex benefited 
millions of people in the New York metropolitan area either directly or indirectly through 
lower traffic congestion, increased rates of return to investment, and increased leisure time.  
Were those same dollars spent upon a similar project in a far smaller urban area such as 
Pocatello, Idaho, they would clearly have had a much smaller welfare impact.   
Now consider the marginal returns of per capita spending.  Because of spillover 
effects, the marginal return on an additional dollar of total spending and an additional dollar 
of per capita spending are predictably incongruent.  In particular, the marginal return on per 
capita spending on public capital is necessarily falling faster in highly populated areas than 
it is in lowly populated ones.  This follows because, for any given amount of per capita 
spending, a high population state, by definition, has more total spending than a low 
population one and with respect to the production of perfectly non-rival public goods, it is 
the total quantity of spillover-creating goods, not the per capita quantity, that most closely 
correlates to benefits.  The end result is that, ceteris paribus, a high population state will 
generally reach its efficiency condition with fewer per capita dollars spent on spillover-
creating public capital than a low population one.   
 
3. A simple two-state example 
 
For the purpose of exposition, suppose that in a state, “Small,” with a population of 
100, the federal government spends $1,000, i.e. $10 per capita, on a perfectly non-rival 
public good that creates an average of $20 of benefit to each citizen of Small (assume 
benefits do not spillover to other states). Suppose that another state, “Large,” with a 
population of 500, also receives $1,000, in this case only $2 per capita, for the creation of 
the very same public good, which also generates an average of $20 of benefit to each of its 
                                                 
10 This definition of efficiency says nothing about “global efficiency.”  It does not presume 
that New Dealers necessarily spent the efficient amount on public goods for the entire 
economy.  Rather it examines efficiency for any given total allocation of public goods in 
the United States.  The analysis in this paper is independent of whether or not global 
efficiency is met.    
  3citizens.  Both of these states receive the same per capita economic benefit from the public 
good, an average of $20, even though federal per capita spending is five times higher in 
Small than in Large.
11   
From here consider the effect of an additional dollar spent creating non-rival public 
capital in the two states.  The one-thousand and first dollar would clearly have more 
positive impact in Large since five times as many people could benefit from the public 
capital’s creation.  Clearly then, other factors constant, an efficient provision of public 
goods would have more total spending in Large than in Small.  Following through on this 
logic, suppose efficiency—i.e. where the marginal benefits of spending are equal in the two 
states—was reached at, say, $4,000 of total spending in Large, and $2,000 in Small.  In per 
capita terms, Large receives $8, while Small receives $20.  While the margins are equated, 
with respect to total per capita benefits, citizens of Large are actually better off than those 
of the Small even though they received fewer per capita expenditures.  See the Appendix 
for a graphical analysis of this particular case and for more general support of the 
supposition that an efficient level of per capita spending on pure public goods will normally 
be higher in small population states.  
 
4. Impure public goods, population, and population density 
 
Of course the analysis above is a simplification, as perfectly non-rival public goods, 
which have a similar impact upon everyone in a state are the exception rather than rule.  
Most public capital projects cannot be classified as pure public goods, but rather impure 
ones.  In particular, spillovers from public capital such as roads, bridges, schools, libraries, 
and streetlights will generally create economic benefits only to those who live or work in 
the areas near them rather than equally to all citizens of the state.  To the extent that 
depression-era public capital projects were associated with geographically-limited 
spillovers, a state’s population density would play a particularly important role in 
determining the economic benefits accrued from the creation of public capital.  Specifically, 
ceteris paribus, citizens in a densely populated state such as Rhode Island would have 
received more per capita economic benefit from a dollar spent on the creation of public 
capital than those living in a sparsely populated, rural state such as Wyoming or Montana, 
because a greater number of Rhode Islanders would have been likely to live in the vicinity 
of the capital.  This suggests that highly and densely populated states should have received 
fewer per capita expenditures than small population and rural states, other factors held 
constant, if the distribution of spending on public goods was economically efficient.  
Table 1 lists the 48 states in order of their per capita allotment of New Deal 
spending between 1933 and 1939 and reports the state’s ranking with respect to both 
inverse population and the inverse of its population density.  The correlation is striking.  
The nine least densely populated states (and 14 of 15) are also the nine states that received 
the most per capita New Deal expenditures.  Whether New Dealers meant it to be or not, 
this expenditure distribution is entirely consistent with an efficient provision of spending on 
spillover-creating public goods.  
                                                 
11 Another way to view this is that the total benefits are five times higher in the 
large population state than the small given the same level of total spending. 
  4Relevant to this discussion, Wallis (1998, 2001) and Fleck (2001) recently 
incorporated population and population density into their analyses of New Deal spending 
and have found, not surprisingly in light of Table 1, that these measures can account for the 
vast majority of the state-level variation.
12 In fact, when Fleck (2001, p. 302) includes 
inverse population density (land per capita), he claims his regressions, which have high r-
squares and coefficients on the political and economic variables that are consistent with 
their predicted signs, reveal “an empirical relationship that has eluded economists for over 
25 years.”  While Wallis and Fleck attribute the explanatory power of population and 
population density to factors such as spending formulas or needing money to maintain land, 
these variables serve as a useful proxy for the quantity of spillover effects associated with 
public goods.  A public goods analysis, then, could provide an alternative explanation to 




  While social scientists face clear challenges in attempting to divine the intent behind 
government spending, we can examine those expenditures in light of economic efficiency.  
The economic theory of public goods suggests that the general distribution of New Deal 
spending, with rural states getting more per capita spending than densely populated ones, is 
consistent with this end.  Further empirical work should examine the composition of state-
level New Deal projects to more precisely determine the extent that expenditures in various 
states went to spillover-creating public capital rather than simply transfer payments such as 
agricultural subsidies or “leaf-raking” type projects.   
                                                 
12 Wallis (2001) finds that a parsimonious regression with an intercept, inverse population, 
and population density as independent variables, can explain over 70 percent of the 
variation in per capita New Deal spending.  Inverse population is positive and significant 
while population density is negative and significant.   
  5Table 1 
Per Capita Spending, Inverse Population, and  
Inverse Population Density Rank
 
  State       Per Capita      Inverse   Least Dense 
       Allocation     Pop Rank    Pop Rank 
 
Nevada          1499.39   1  9 
Montana 986.30   10 2 
Wyoming 896.91    2  1 
Arizona 791.46    6  4 
Idaho 744.15    7  5 
North Dakota  707.84   11  8 
South Dakota  701.61   12  7 
New Mexico  689.76   8  3 
Utah 569.49    9  6 
California 538.10  44  22 
Nebraska 536.87  17  12 
Oregon 535.66  15  11 
Washington 527.77  19  15 
Colorado 506.30  16  10 
Iowa 466.70  29  23 
Kansas 434.30  20  13 
Minnesota 425.50  31  18 
Arkansas 396.12  25  20 
Vermont 390.49 4  21 
Wisconsin 390.26  36  30 
Michigan 388.99  42  37 
Ohio 383.24  45  41 
Florida 377.21  23  19 
Louisiana 369.88  28  25 
 
 
Source:  New Deal expenditures are from 
Reading (1973).  Population density was 
computed by dividing population by acres 










   
State              Per Capita       Inverse   Least Dense 
                        Allocation      Pop Rank    Pop Rank 
 
Illinois 364.88  46  40 
Texas 361.70  43  14 
Mississippi 358.18  26  24 
Maryland 344.82  21 42 
Tennessee 344.48  34 33 
Oklahoma 342.66  27 17 
Missouri 340.07 39  28 
Maine 336.07  14  16 
New York  334.81  48  44 
Indiana 333.22  37  38 
New Jersey  330.47  40  47 
Delaware  310.13 3 39 
Alabama 309.78 32  29 
South Carolina  306.43  22  31 
Massachusetts 286.26  41  46 
Georgia 272.69  35  26 
West Virginia  265.11  24  36 
Pennsylvania 260.88  47  43 
Virginia 254.91 30  32 
Kentucky 251.04  33 34 
New  Hampshire  247.76 5 27 
Rhode Island  246.56  13  48 
Connecticut 236.92  18  45 
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  8Appendix  
 
Figure 1A shows the corresponding marginal benefits of pure public goods in the case of two states 
described in the text, “Small” with population of 100 and “Large” with population of 500.  Two 
properties of note are:  
 
(1)  The marginal benefit equals zero (intercept of the X-axis) at the same quantity of pure public 
goods in both states.  This follows by construction since we assume that the citizens of Large and 
Small have identical preferences such that the same Q
th unit of the pure pubic good provides no 
additional utility.    
 
(2)  The marginal benefit curve of Large (MBL) is always five times higher than the marginal benefit 
curve for Small (MBS), for all positive marginal benefits.  This follows because each unit of the pure 
public good provides the same average benefit to each citizen, and there are five times as many 
citizens in Large as in Small.  Note that for this to be true, MBBL is sloped five times as steeply as 
MBS, so that the marginal benefits of additional projects are falling five times faster in Large as in 
Small. 
 
Given the properties described by (1) and (2), at any quantity of pure public goods, such as QS, the 
marginal benefit for Large (5c) is five times that for Small (c). Furthermore, for any constant 
marginal cost of providing a unit of the pure public good, such as c, “Large” will always (assuming 
the equal-marginal definition of efficiency) receive a greater provision than “Small” so that QL > QS.  
However, since Large’s population exceeds Small’s by a factor of five, Small will have more per 
capita spending so long as QL is less than five times as large as QS (QL < 5QS).  This will be true for 
all c below c~.  In summary, for any marginal cost below c~, an efficient level of per capita 
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